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July 9th marks the second anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of 
South Sudan, the 54th member state of the African Union. The partition of Sudan 
into two states followed a January 2011 referendum in which 98.8% of southern 
Sudanese voted for independence. The referendum was part of the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that officially ended a twenty-year war 
between the central government in Khartoum and the South-based Sudan 
Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM). This partition raises a number of 
questions: how should the break-up of Sudan be understood, and what is the 
current state of relations between the two Sudanese states? Should the break-up 
be seen as the first time an African state disintegrated in the postcolonial era? 
Was it the inevitable outcome of a cultural clash between a Muslim “Arab” North 
and a Christian-animist “African” South?  
 
Sudan’s partition can be better understood by locating its roots in colonial 
history, focusing on a specific episode of the mid-20th century (when two Sudans 
became one) that curiously mirrors the current situation (one Sudan becoming 
two). In essence, British policies of separation between the North and the South, 
followed by northern attempts at forceful Arabization and Islamization of the 
South, set the stage for the failure of the unified Sudanese state that was 
established in 1956.  
 
The 2011 secession of South Sudan is often viewed as a direct consequence of 
the longest civil war experienced on the African continent in the postcolonial era. 
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Indeed, from the moment of its establishment, Sudan was plagued by successive 
civil wars (1955-1972/1983-2005) that claimed millions of lives and displaced 
even larger numbers of people from their home areas.1 The 2011 political split 
between the North and the South ensued from the ongoing conflict between 
Khartoum’s ruling elites and the southern rebel movements. The former stressed 
the “Arab” and Islamic identity of Sudan, while the latter, depending on the time 
period and leadership, advocated either regional autonomy for the South or 
cultural pluralism in a unitary state.2 For decades, these actors have been 
engaged in a military struggle over the cultural basis of the Sudanese state, 
political power and representation, the distribution of economic resources, and 
the provision of social services. However, partition should not be seen 
retrospectively as an inevitable outcome of Sudan’s postcolonial civil wars. 
Current trends in Sudanese politics are grounded in older realities and policies 
going back to colonial—and even “pre-colonial”—times.  
 
Historical Background 
Sudan in its pre-2011 borders has a relatively short yet extremely volatile 
history as a political unit. Until the early 20th century the areas covered by 
current-day Sudan and South Sudan were never united in a single administrative 
unit. The Ottoman-Egyptian rulers of Sudan (1821-1885) had incorporated parts 
of the South into their polity, but these conquests occurred at a late stage—just 
ten years before the Ottoman-Egyptian authorities were evicted by the Sudanese 
Mahdist movement in 1885. Under the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad and his 
successor, the Khalifa Abdullahi, the Mahdist state (1885-1898) extended 
towards the southern region of Bahr al-Ghazal but never included the whole of 
the South. Only after the occupation of the country by Anglo-Egyptian troops 
(1899) were the North and the South formally assembled into what came to be 
known as the “Anglo-Egyptian Sudan” (see map below). The new entity’s 
population was nominally governed by a joint Anglo-Egyptian administration 
during the following fifty years, the Condominium era (1899-1956). In practice, 
the British monopolized the highest administrative positions and retained all 
                                            
1 On the Sudanese civil wars, see Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars 
(Oxford: International African Institute & James Currey, 2003); Robert O. Collins, Civil Wars and 
Revolution in the Sudan: Essays on the Sudan, Southern Sudan and Darfur, 1962-2004 (Hollywood, 
CA: Tsehai, 2005); Scopas S. Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in 
the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
2 Both the North and the South are home to a great variety of ethnic, religious and linguistic 
groups. In the last centuries, Islam and the Arabic language have been dominant in the North but 
also present in the South. In the North, groups such as the Fūr, the Masālīt, the Zaghāwa and the 
Beja are Muslims but do not identify themselves as “Arabs”. They have their own languages and 
also use Arabic. Christianity was introduced in the South by European and American 
missionaries, where it has coexisted with Islam and various local religions. Dozens of languages 
are spoken in South Sudan, including English, various forms of Arabic, Dinka, Nuer, Bari and 
Zande. 
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decision-making powers. Egyptian nationalists, for their part, championed the 
principle of the “unity of the Nile Valley” and claimed sovereignty rights over 
Sudan until the fall of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952.3 
 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899-1956)4 
 
 
 
The Southern Policy 
During most of the colonial period, the British did not govern one Sudan but 
rather two: the North and the South. Hence, despite the international recognition 
of a territorial unit called “Sudan” or “Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,” British policies 
strengthened the idea and the reality of two separate Sudans. Why did the British 
administer separately the North and the South until 1947? British officials often 
referred to cultural and religious differences between a predominantly Arabic-
                                            
3 Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question: The Dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1884-1951 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1952); Lawrence A. Fabunmi, The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A 
Case Study in Power Politics, 1800-1956 (London: Longmans, 1960). 
4 Author’s adaptation from a map drawn by Rosalind Caldecott for K. D. D. Henderson’s Set Under 
Authority: Being a Portrait of the Life of the British District Officer in the Sudan under the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium, 1898-1955 (Castle Cary: Castle Cary Press, 1987), SAD 769/7/4-6 [MP], 
Durham University Library, UK. 
Northern Sudan 
Southern Sudan 
~ current-day Sudan 
~ current-day South Sudan 
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speaking Muslim North and an “animist” and Christian South. In fact, the 
emphasis on real and imagined differences was closely linked to British attempts 
to prevent Arabic culture and Islamic values from spreading into southern 
Sudan, a process that had started unfolding in previous centuries. Thus the 
British gave a free hand to Christian missionaries in the South while considerably 
restricting their presence in the North. They also expressed concern for the well-
being of southern populations, which they perceived as easy prey for northern 
“Arab” slave traders.5 This preoccupation was connected to the long history of 
slavery in Sudan, but it was consciously used to legitimize separate rule. In 
addition, the “Southern Policy” allowed the British to concentrate scarce 
economic resources in the North while limiting expenditure in what they 
considered the “barbaric” South. The Southern Policy touched upon various 
aspects of government and social life. The language of administration was Arabic 
in the North, English in the South. Whereas a government educational system 
was gradually developed in the North, education was left to missionaries in the 
South. The circulation of people and goods between the two areas was severely 
restricted from 1922 onwards. Southerners were forbidden to bear Arabic 
names and “mixed” marriages involving northern and southern Sudanese were 
strongly discouraged.6 
 
From Two Sudans to One Sudan 
By the early 1940s, the Southern Policy was harshly criticized by the Northern 
Sudanese intelligentsia and by some British officials. The gap in infrastructures 
and development between the North and the South was increasingly seen as a 
problem. In 1945 the British authorities in Khartoum considered three possible 
options for southern Sudan: unifying it with the North, attaching it to the 
territories of British East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika), or integrating 
part of it to the North and the rest to East Africa.7 The possibility of establishing 
an independent, separate state in southern Sudan at some point in the future was 
ruled out on geographical and economic grounds. In addition,  the reversal of the 
Southern Policy was instrumental in British attempts to co-opt northern 
Sudanese elites against Egyptian ambitions of uniting the Nile Valley. By 
satisfying one of the main demands of northern Sudanese nationalists (the 
unification of northern and southern Sudan), the British hoped to gain traction in 
their political and ideological dispute with the Egyptian government. 
                                            
5 David Sconyers, “Fading Voices: Some Reflections on British Rule in the Sudan,” Sudan Notes 
and Records, New Series No. 3 (1999), pp. 68-70. 
6 Muddathir Abd al-Rahim, “The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan, 1899-
1947,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 2(3), 1966, pp. 231-235 ; Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern 
Sudan: Background to Conflict (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1968), pp. 48-53, 115. 
7 Beshir Mohammed Said, The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa (London: The Bodley Head, 1965), 
p. 30. 
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Most of the British officials posted in the South opposed the reversal of the 
Southern Policy, fearing that northern officials would seek to impose their Arab 
and Islamic culture upon the southern Sudanese. They also condemned the fact 
that not one single southern representative had been consulted on the 
unification issue.8 In response, on June 12-13, 1947, the British governors of the 
three southern provinces, seventeen Southerners, and six Northerners gathered 
in Juba to discuss the relations between Northern and Southern Sudan. Most of 
the southern representatives endorsed unification. They nonetheless stressed 
what they saw as the backwardness of the South compared to the North and 
expressed worries about the prospect of being dominated by their northern 
neighbors.9 The Juba conference stirred a political and historiographical 
controversy in the postcolonial era: Northern scholars sought to legitimize the 
Sudanese unitary state by claiming that the Southerners had expressed full 
support for unification in 1947.10 Southern politicians and historians, for their 
part, claimed that unification had already been decided before the conference 
and that it would have been carried out even had the southern representatives 
voiced disapproval. Another argument was that the southern leaders expressed 
support for unification only after they had been threatened or blackmailed by 
northern participants.11 
 
In any case, British authorities in Khartoum proceeded to hastily unify the 
northern and southern regions. One result was the gradual “Nordization” of 
southern education from 1949 to the 1960s: Arabic was introduced in southern 
schools, first as a subject-matter and then as a teaching medium, and northern 
Sudanese curricula replaced missionary programs. Most missionary schools 
were nationalized one year after Sudanese independence (1957).12 Coupled with 
                                            
8 Beshir, The Southern Sudan, pp. 122-135. 
9 Ibid., pp. 136-153. 
10 Ibid., pp. 65-66; Said, The Sudan, p. 44; Abd al-Rahim, “The Development of British Policy,” 
p. 244.  
11 Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question,” in Dunstan Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan: The 
Problem of National Integration (London: F. Cass, 1973), p. 16; Bona Malwal, People and Power in 
Sudan: The Struggle for National Stability (London: Ithaca Press, 1981), p. 26; Lilian P. Sanderson 
and George N. Sanderson, Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan: 1899-1964 (London: 
Ithaca Press and Khartoum: Khartoum University Press), 1981, p. 296; Deng D. Akol Ruay, The 
Politics of Two Sudans: The South and the North 1821-1969 (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute 
of African Studies, 1994), pp. 52-53. 
12 Ministry of Education, Proposals for the Expansion and Improvement of the Educational System 
in the Southern Provinces, 1951-56 (Khartoum: McCorquodale & Co., 1950), p. 3; Said, The Sudan, 
pp. 185-189; Sanderson and Sanderson, Education, Religion and Politics, pp. 298, 336, 359-361; 
Fadwa ʿAbd al-Raḥman ʿAlī Ṭaha, ʿAbd al-Raḥman ʿAlī Ṭaha 1901-1969 bayna al-Taʿlīm wa-l-Siyāsa 
wa-Arbajī (Khartoum: Dār Jāmiʿat al-Kharṭūm li-l-Nashr, 2004), pp. 223-227, 233. 
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the political and economic marginalization of the southern Sudanese,13 
Arabization and Islamization policies carried out in the South by successive 
Khartoum governments from 1949 onwards played a critical part in stirring up 
the civil war that began in 1955. President Jaʿafar Nimeiry’s imposition of shariʿa 
law upon the whole country (1983) and Omar al-Bashir’s coup d’état (1989), 
which brought Hasan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front to power, were turning-
points in the second phase of the North-South conflict (1983-2005). 
 
Post-Secession Sudan and Colonial Resonances 
The recent “divorce” between the North and the South is in many ways a reversal 
of Sudan’s political evolution in the last decade of colonial rule (1946-1956), 
when two Sudans were amalgamated into one political unit. Sudan’s current 
division into two states suggests the need for reimagining the “national” history 
of each country. Until 2011 Sudanese historiography was broadly divided along 
northern and southern interpretations. Whereas northerners portrayed Britain’s 
Southern Policy as a central cause of the Sudanese civil wars (it “stopped” the 
historical process of Arabization in the South and prevented the emergence of an 
all-Sudanese national identity), southerners often blamed the British for giving it 
up too hastily, “surrendering” southern Sudan to northern political elites. As one 
Japanese scholar has pointed out, concepts such as “Sudan,” “Sudanese nation,” 
and “Sudanese history” need to be rethought by both academics and citizens.14  
 
On a more practical level, the viability of the Sudans as two independent states 
depends not so much on historical precedents of “one” or “two” Sudans, but on 
the ability of their leaders to solve contentious issues between the two countries 
and answer urgent needs within each country. Border demarcation, oil sharing, 
and citizenship/nationality laws are disputed issues that still await solutions.15 
                                            
13 Until 1948, southern civil servants earned lower wages than their northern counterparts. No 
southerner was invited to the Cairo discussions between the Sudanese political parties and the 
Egyptian government (1952-1953), which paved the way for Sudanese self-determination. 
Moreover, the southern Sudanese obtained only six out of the 800 administrative posts that were 
“Sudanized” in 1954. 
14 Yoshiko Kurita, “Rethinking the Role of Historiography in Sudan at the Time of Crisis: The 
Deconstruction and Reconstruction of 'Sudanese History,'” Paper presented at the International 
Summer School on Sudanese Studies, Khartoum, University of Khartoum, October 2011. 
15 See John P. Cann, “Sudan on a Precipice,” Security in Africa. IDA Research Notes (Summer 2012), 
pp. 14-20, https://www.ida.org/upload/research%20notes/researchnotessummer2012.pdf; 
“South Sudan Pleads for Public Support on Cooperation Deal with Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, 
15 October 2012, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44212; Adam Mohamed 
Ahmad, “Border and Abyei Issues Threaten Recent Deal Between South Sudan and Sudan,” The 
Niles, 6 November 2012, http://www.theniles.org/articles/?id=1543; Atem Simon Mabior, “Al-
Kharṭūm wa-Jūbā: Fakk al-Irtibāṭ wa-Ḍakhkh al-Bitrūl,” The Niles, 19 November 2012, 
http://www.theniles.org/articles/index-ar.php?id=1576; Augustino Ting Mayai, “Sudanese 
Refugee Influx into South Sudan: Security and Bilateral Relations Implications,” Weekly Review 
(The Sudd Institute), 21 November 2012, 
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Current efforts by the African Union at mediating between Khartoum and Juba 
may facilitate the implementation of cooperation agreements signed last year by 
the two countries.16  
 
Yet bilateral issues should not divert local and international attention from 
internal problems in each one of the Sudans. To avoid new episodes of secession 
or implosion in the coming years—especially in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue 
Nile and the Eastern Sudan—the ruling elites of both countries will have to 
address a wide array of issues ranging from security, infrastructures, social 
services, and employment to the regional distribution of resources, political 
representation of various groups, and individual liberties.17 The successful 
fostering of inclusive national identities—or at least allegiances—in each Sudan 
will require the broader society in Sudan and South Sudan to turn to pluralistic 
models and give up exclusivist claims based on ethnicity. Dominant groups such 
as the riverain self-defined “Arab” tribes in Sudan and the Dinka in South Sudan 
will have to acknowledge the role of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities in 
the history of the region and recognize the place of these minorities in current 
society. 
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http://suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/Immigration-and-Security-in-South-
Sudanformat2.pdf; Joseph Edward, “Sudan and South Sudan Pledge to Ease Border Tensions,” 
The Niles, 12 March 2013, http://www.theniles.org/articles/?id=1744; Bronwen Manby, The 
Right to a Nationality and the Secession of South Sudan: A Commentary on the Impact of the New 
Laws, The Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa, 2 July 2012, 
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/OSIEA-AfriMAP-Nationality-Sudans-full-
EN.pdf. 
16 “Sudan Formally Accepts AU Mediation Proposal to Defuse Tensions with Juba,” Sudan Tribune, 
16 June 2013, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46978. 
17 See “Opposition Party Says Sudan’s NCP Using Poverty & Unemployment as Weapons against 
People,” Sudan Tribune, 10 March 2013, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45776. 
A Civil Society Forum on Sudan and South Sudan was convened in Addis Ababa on 21-23 January 
2013, during which Sudanese, South Sudanese, African and European NGOs discussed some of 
the more pressing issues (humanitarian situation, citizenship, civil rights, political freedoms). 
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